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On July 27, 1995, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) announced new transfer pricing guidelines' to
replace its outdated 1979 Report2 on the same topic. This action sent an
unequivocal message to the international community: Cancel all plans
for a global tax war. The tax delegations to the OECD courageously
demonstrated how countries can resolve disputes and smooth the func-
tioning of international trade by valuing agreement over self-interest.
The OECD guidelines have been heralded as a new international consen-
sus, 3 and an important achievement both for the twenty-five member
countries4 and for the international business community. Countries have
agreed on a principle for analysing transfer pricing and on a means to
* Deputy Head, Fiscal Affairs Division, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development. The views expressed in this article are those of the author only and should not be
taken as reflecting the position of the OECD or its member countries.
1. Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations,
Organisation For Economic Co-operation And Development (OECD) (July 1995) [hereinafter
"1995 Guidelines"].
2. Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises, OECD (May 1979) [hereinafter "1979
Report"].
3. See, e.g., Arnaud Leparmentier, Les pays de I'OCDE s'accordent sur la fiscalite des
multinationales, LE MONDE, Aug. 1, 1995.
4. OECD membership increased to 26 countries with the accession of the Czech Republic in
late 1995.
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implement that principle. Surely this is a welcome development, a sig-
nificant step towards minimizing conflicts and avoiding double taxation.
But this agreement can hardly be considered new. The OECD's
1979 report on transfer pricing embodied the same arm's length princi-
ple. The reaffirmation of this principle is notable, given the widely-
reported doubts that had been cast on its continuing viability. So what,
then, is new? How, and why, does this 140-page document differ from
the 1979 report?
There are many differences to observe, but they reflect no deviation
from the 1979 concepts. Instead, the changes endorse, elaborate and
extend the principles established in 1979. Perhaps the most distinguish-
ing part of the 1995 guidelines is the third chapter, which addresses
"Other Methods,"5 including profit methods that might be used to
approximate arms length conditions. But this work on profit methods
should not overshadow other, substantial advances that the new guide-
lines make. Given the role to which profit methods are relegated in the
new consensus, other analytic developments likely will be far more
important in daily practice. To this end, the discussion below describes
the most significant developments in the new guidelines as compared
with the 1979 report, including the issue of profit methods.
I. STATEMENT OF THE ARM's LENGTH PRINCIPLE
The new guidelines indicate expressly, for the first time, that Arti-
cle 9, Paragraph 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is the "authori-
tative statement of the arm's length principle."6 Conversely, the 1979
report indicated that the arm's length principle was "the underlying
assumption" of Article 9, Paragraph 17 and stated that "the arm's length
principle as expressed in the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention
has to be followed ....8 Thus, the 1979 report merely implied that
Article 9, Paragraph 1 and the arm's length principle were equivalent,
while the new guidelines explicitly make this point.
This development is relevant because it helps clarify the means for
determining conformity with the arm's length principle. The language
of Article 9, Paragraph 1 makes clear that an adjustment satisfies the
arm's length principle when the adjustment includes in an associated
enterprise's profit any profits that would have accrued to that enterprise
"but for" conditions made or imposed between associated enterprises in
their financial relations that differ from the conditions that would be
5. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, IN 3.1-3.74.
6. Id. 1.6.
7. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 3.
8. Id. 37.
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made between independent enterprises.9
This statement has both positive and negative implications for
profit methods. The positive implication is that Article 9, Paragraph I
does not per se preclude adjustments that arise from profits accruing to
an associated enterprise. This should hardly be surprising, given that
two of the traditional methods the 1979 report endorsed, resale price and
cost plus, examine profit margins. The negative implication is more
sobering. Article 9, Paragraph 1 requires a "but for" connection
between the improper accrual of profits and the existence of improprie-
ties in the economic and financial relations between the associated enter-
prises. This requirement, once taken seriously, presents an
insurmountable obstacle to the regular use of profit methods on an over-
all company-wide basis (or to the use of any method in such a way).
Many factors can affect the overall accrual of profits by an independent
enterprise, some of which may be wholly unrelated to the controlled
transaction for which transfer pricing is in question. When a transfer
pricing inquiry extends beyond profits of the controlled transaction,' 0 it
examines conditions unrelated to those between the associated enter-
prises involved in the transaction, thereby risking a violation of the
arm's length principle. This analysis ultimately led the OECD to articu-
late for the first time the concept of a "transactional profit method,"'"
and to reject any profit-based analysis inconsistent with that concept.
A. Comparability Analysis and Business Strategies
The new guidelines include seven pages of discussion about the
factors that can influence the comparability of controlled and uncon-
trolled transactions for purposes of applying the arm's length principle.' 2
Most of this material is new and has no counterpart in the 1979 report.
It is the product of the experience of tax administrations and businesses
in applying the arm's length principle since 1979, and generally has
been perceived by the business community as helpful in providing gui-
dance and direction.
The 1979 report cited the need for comparability of: geographic
markets,' 3 market levels,' 4 goods,' 5 functions performed and risks
9. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 1.6.
10. The "transaction" could be several controlled transactions that are appropriately
aggregated. The new guidelines include a discussion of aggregation rules, as discussed infra
section I1.C.
11. 1955 Guidelines, supra note 1, 3.2.
12. Id. IN 1.19-3.5.
13. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 49.
14. Id. 50.
15. Id. ([ 51-54.
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assumed by resellers, 16 and other considerations, such as product
innovativeness, 17 market conditions,18 custom of the trade,' 9 how the
MNE is organized,20 general economic functions, and "all other relevant
facts and circumstances of each individual case ... ." The new guide-
lines provide much more detail about the relevant factors, including a
discussion of functional analysis applicable to all transfer pricing
methods.22
In addition to the expanded comparability discussion, it is also
important to note a significant development regarding business strate-
gies. The 1979 report barely recognized the possible effects of business
strategies on pricing policy, as well as the need to adjust for any differ-
ences in business strategies between controlled and uncontrolled transac-
tions. It acknowledged two examples of business strategies that might
properly influence price. In the first example, a supplier waives pay-
ment from a customer "in temporary difficulties in order to preserve a
potentially valuable outlet for his goods. 23 In the second, sellers tem-
porarily lower prices as part of a market penetration or start-up
strategy.24
In contrast, the new guidelines recognize a whole list of business
strategies that could influence price,25 and that list is not even meant to
be exhaustive. 26 The guidelines offer market penetration schemes as one
example.2 There is a specific acknowledgement that market penetration
schemes may fail, and the guidelines give guidance on how to evaluate a
strategy that results in temporarily decreased profits in return for higher
expected profits in the longer term.28
16. Id. 59. This functional analysis is only implicit in the discussion of the cost-plus pricing
method discussed in paragraph 65 of the report. However, functional analysis should not be
overemphasized. It is specifically mentioned as a useful way to "begin" in "examining the
transfer prices adopted within a multinational enterprise .... " Id. 17.
17. Id. 1 55.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 1995 Guidelines, supra note i, M 1.19-1.35. For this discussion, interested parties should
refer directly to the text of the guidelines and not to a condensation, because the value of the
discussion is in its technical detail.
23. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 1 40.
24. Id. 43.
25. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, M 1.31-1.35.
26. Note the phrases "such as" and "could include" when referring to business strategies. Id.
IM 1.31-1.32.
27. Id. IM 1.32-1.35.
28. Id. 1.35.
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B. Recognition of the Actual Transactions
The new guidelines provide instruction on when a tax administra-
tion may disregard the structure the taxpayer adopts in entering into a
controlled transaction.2 9 In this respect, the new guidelines are both
more precise and more limiting than the 1979 report. The 1979 report
indicated that a tax administration "as a general principle '30 should base
the search for arm's length pricing on actual transactions, while
acknowledging that "there may be some circumstances where the form
of transaction has effectively to be ignored."'31 Those circumstances,
although described as "exceptional cases, 32 seem to extend, to any
arrangements "frequently" 33 encountered between associated enterprises
that "are not or are very rarely encountered between unrelated parties
... .,3 The report also states that "[in such instances tax authorities
would have to determine what is the underlying reality behind an
arrangement in considering what the appropriate arm's length price
would be."35
This language, while open to differing interpretations, could be read
to suggest that restructuring could occur whenever the associated enter-
prises enter into an arrangement that differs from what independent
enterprises would have done. The tax administration would be free in
such a case to search for the "reality" as reflected by the behavior of
independent enterprises.
The new guidelines limit the possibility of such an interpretation.
First, they expressly state that "[iun other than exceptional cases, the tax
administration should not disregard the actual transactions or substitute
other transactions for them. '36 The guidelines recognize only two cir-
cumstances when restructuring may be appropriate and legitimate.37
The first is "where the economic substance of a transaction differs from
its form,"3 such as where an investment in an associated enterprise is
structured as debt in economic circumstances where the substance is a
subscription of capital.39 The second circumstance is where the
"arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their total-
ity, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent
29. Id. IM 1.36-1.41.
30. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 15.
31. Id.
32. Id. 23.
33. Id. 24.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 1.36.
37. Id. 1.37.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner and the actual
structure practically impedes the tax administration from determining an
appropriate transfer price."40
This rule is far more restrictive than the 1979 rule that allowed
restructuring whenever the parties arranged their affairs differently than
independent enterprises. The new rule sets up two additional hurdles.
First, independent enterprises must not have considered the arrange-
ments "commercially rational" under the circumstances. 4' Second, the
tax administration must effectively have no other recourse for fixing
arm's length pricing.42 Both of these conditions must be met for restruc-
turing to occur where the form and substance of a transaction are the
same. 
4 3
C. Evaluation of Separate and Combined Transactions
In keeping with the Article 9 articulation of the arm's length princi-
ple, the new guidelines provide that ideally the principle "should be
applied on a transaction-by-transaction basis."'  At the same time, the
guidelines recognize that there are circumstances in which it would be
appropriate to aggregate transactions. The guidelines articulate a spe-
cific standard for when this may occur: "where separate transactions are
so closely linked or continuous that they cannot be evaluated adequately
on a separate basis."45 They cite a number of examples, such as long-
term contracts for the supply of commodities or services, rights to use
intangible property, and pricing a range of closely linked products when
determining the price for each product or transaction is "impractical. 46
The 1979 report provides less instruction on this point. It states
that, "[i]t may be reasonable in some circumstances to analyse the trans-
fer prices for product lines or other groupings rather than to ascertain an
arm's length price for each individual product or sale."' The report
cites as examples situations where some products are sold below market
price to allow a higher profit on related products.48 It also discusses
"package deals, 49 where "a single charge is made for a variety of bene-
fits,"5 such as patent licenses, technical and administrative services, and
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. 1 1.42.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 41.
48. Id.
49. Id. 19.
50. Id.
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selling or leasing production facilities, "all for an undifferentiated
payment." 51
The main difference between the 1995 guidelines and the 1979
report is that the new guidelines provide a standard for determining
whether aggregation of controlled transactions is appropriate. This stan-
dard is important for both taxpayers and tax administrations. From the
taxpayer's perspective, the standard will protect against the global appli-
cation of pricing methods by tax administrations. The arm's length prin-
ciple will require a transaction-by-transaction analysis, except where
transactions are "so closely linked or continuous '5 2 that a separate anal-
ysis will not work. The standard will help tax administrations protect
against the combination of transactions in a way that impedes a proper
arm's length analysis. Thus, the new guidelines recognize that in some
cases, package transactions may need to be evaluated separately. How-
ever, after such an analysis the tax administration should still consider
"whether in total the transfer pricing for the entire package is arm's
length. '5 3 This latter qualification should prevent tax examiners from
inappropriately selecting for adjustment ("cherry-picking") the part of
the package that is not arm's length without considering whether offsets
exist in other parts of the package.
In short, both taxpayers and tax administrations now have flexible
rule allowing separate transactions to be combined to permit a practical
analysis, in keeping with business realities. At the same time, the new
guidelines have attempted to articulate a standard to prevent aggregation
from being abused.
D. Use of an Arm's Length Range
Using an arm's length range of transfer pricing is perhaps one of
the most important additions that the new guidelines make. The 1979
report acknowledged that "an arm's length price will in many cases not
be precisely ascertainable and that in such circumstances it will be nec-
essary to seek for [sic] a reasonable approximation to it." 4 The report
relied on this observation to justify the conclusion that it may be useful
to employ more than one method to reach a satisfactory approximation
of an arm's length price, but it still seemed to envision only one price
(albeit an approximate one).55 The 1979 report also indicated that, in
light of the need for judgment in determining transfer pricing, if a price
51. Id.
52. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, T 1.42.
53. Id. 1.43.
54. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 46.
55. Id. 1 46-47.
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appeared to be arm's length "there would be no justification for seeking
to make merely minor or marginal adjustments ....
The new guidelines also state that "[tlax administrators should hesi-
tate from making minor or marginal adjustments."" However, the
guidelines go further, specifically endorsing an arm's length range in
many situations: "However, because transfer pricing is not an exact sci-
ence, there will also be many occasions when the application of the most
appropriate method or methods produces a range of figures all of which
are relatively equally reliable. ' 8 Several paragraphs elaborate on the
concept of the arm's length range.59 The 1979 report contained none of
this material. New paragraph 1.48 states specifically that "[i]f the rele-
vant conditions of the controlled transactions (e.g. price or margin) are
within the arm's length range, no adjustment should be made."60 When
a taxpayer's pricing is outside the range that the tax administration
determines, the taxpayer may present evidence that the range should be
expanded. 6' "[A]djustments should be made to the point within the
range that best reflects the facts and circumstances of the particular con-
trolled transaction," where possible.62
E. Set-offs
The discussion of set-offs in the new guidelines and the 1979 report
are very similar. Both acknowledge that intentional set-offs should be
allowed.63 An intentional set-off is one where the associated enterprises
knowingly include a balancing of benefits in their arrangements with
each other.' Under the new guidelines, intentional set-offs may occur
only between two associated enterprises. The guidelines give no explicit
indication whether set-offs involving more than two parties (i.e., a trian-
gular arrangement) should be recognized. Unlike the 1979 report, the
new guidelines address the unintentional over-reporting of income on a
transaction that a taxpayer makes to obtain a reduction in a transfer pric-
ing adjustment on another transaction.65 For this type of unintentional
set-off, the Guidelines leave it to the discretion of tax administrations
whether to grant the request, making a clear distinction from intentional
56. Id. 15.
57. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 1.68.
58. Id. 1.45.
59. Id. 1.45-1.48.
60. Id. 1.48.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. 1 1.60; 1979 Report, supra note 2, 20.
64. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 1.60.
65. Id. 1.64.
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set-offs.66
F. Selection of Transfer Pricing Methods
The new guidelines give more specific guidance on selecting trans-
fer pricing methods than the 1979 report did, although the two docu-
ments are generally consistent. The 1979 report preferred the
comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, but recognized that "there
may be cases where the evidence of resale profit mark-ups, production
costs or other data may be more complete, more conclusive and more
easily obtained than undisputable evidence of open market prices. "67
The 1979 report continued:
There should always be the possibility, therefore, of selecting the
method which provides the most cogent evidence in a particular case
.... Frequently, it may be useful to take account of more than one
method of reaching a satisfactory approximation to an arm's length
price in the light of the evidence available.68
The new guidelines similarly favor the CUP method: "Where it is
possible to locate comparable uncontrolled transactions, the CUP
Method is the most direct and reliable way to apply the arm's length
principle. Consequently, in such cases the CUP Method is preferable
over all other methods. ' 69 The 1995 guidelines also prefer the tradi-
tional transaction methods (such as CUP, cost plus and resale price) over
transactional profit methods (such as transactional net margin method
and profit split).70 These latter methods are considered appropriate only
in cases of last resort. 71 Thus, all the methods do not have equal
standing.
Still, like the 1979 report, the new guidelines do not establish a
rigid hierarchy of methods that would force a taxpayer to disprove the
application of one method before using another. The new guidelines
have an order of preference based on "higher degrees of comparability
and a more direct and closer relationship to the transaction. '' 72 The
guidelines state that "[n]o one method is suitable in every possible situa-
tion and the applicability of any particular method need not be dis-
proved.'73 They further provide: "[T]his Report does not require either
the tax examiner or taxpayer to perform analyses under more than one
66. Id.
67. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 46.
68. Id.
69. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 2.7.
70. Id. 2.49.
71. Id.
72. Id. 1.70.
73. Id. 1.68.
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method. '74 The guidelines also recognize that there will be difficult
cases where "no one approach is conclusive,"" and that in such
circumstances:
an attempt should be made to reach a conclusion consistent with the
arm's length principle that is satisfactory from a practical viewpoint
to all the parties involved, taking into account the facts and circum-
stances of the case, the mix of evidence available, and the relative
reliability of the various methods under consideration.76
II. TRADITIONAL TRANSACTION METHODS
A. The Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) Method
The CUP method continues to be regarded as the most theoretically
pure application of the arm's length principle, and so it continues to be
the preferred method. However, during the revision process the business
community and tax administrations complained that, in practice, the
CUP method had become obsolete for all but the simplest cases because
the comparability standard was being too rigidly applied. This concern
suggested a more relaxed comparability standard for the CUP and other
traditional methods. The counterargument is that the standard of compa-
rability must not be so loose for the CUP method that one could, with
impunity, compare apples and oranges.
The 1995 guidelines take a practical approach to the problem, mak-
ing clear that the standard is not as rigid as some had previously thought,
but still requiring "reasonably accurate adjustments" 77 for any material
effects of differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transac-
tions." This is an improvement over the 1979 report, which focused on
transactions in "the same or similar goods."7 9 The comparability stan-
dard has perhaps been broadened, but only to the extent that the CUP
method is not automatically rejected. Rather, when in doubt, the CUP
method is weighed in terms of reliability against other possible methods.
It may prove to be the most reliable method when all the facts and cir-
cumstances are considered.
Thus, the new guidelines provide that
the difficulties that arise in attempting to make reasonably accurate
74. Id. 1.69.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. 2.9.
78. Id.
79. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 45. The 1979 report recognizes that even where "the
differences are important a useful comparison may still be possible so long as appropriate
adjustments can be reasonably made to the uncontrolled price to take account of the differences."
Id. 51.
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adjustments should not routinely preclude the possible application of
the CUP method. Practical considerations dictate a more flexible
approach to enable the CUP Method to be used and to be supple-
mented as necessary by other appropriate methods, all of which
should be evaluated according to their relative accuracy. 0
The new guidelines also adopt a general formulation of the compa-
rability standard for determining whether "an uncontrolled transaction is
comparable to a controlled transaction (i.e. it is a comparable uncon-
trolled transaction) . ... ,"81 The standard requires that "none of the
differences (if any) between the transactions being compared or between
the enterprises undertaking those transactions could materially affect" 2
the measure used to determine the transfer pricing--open market price
in the case of the CUP method,8 3 resale price margin or cost plus mark-
up for the other two traditional methods, 4 or net margin in the case of
the transactional net margin method (TNMM)85 This standard makes it
clear that comparability must be considered no matter what method of
transfer pricing is used.8 6
B. Resale Price and Cost Plus Methods
The two sections of the new guidelines describing the resale price
and cost plus methods perhaps bear the greatest similarity to the 1979
report. These two traditional methods required few changes; experience
seemed to indicate that they had been operating well.
Only one point required substantial rewriting: the treatment of
operating expenses and whether net or gross profit margins should be
compared in these traditional methods. This question grew in impor-
tance when the OECD replaced its discussion of the comparable profits
method with the TNMM, which allows only a transactional comparison
of net profit margins in last-resort cases. The question in the traditional
methods centered around the cost plus method, necessitating a clarifica-
tion of the extent to which operating (below-the-line) expenses could be
accounted for in the cost plus mark-up, and how the analysis would dif-
80. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 2.9.
81. Id. 2.7.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. IN 2.16, 2.34.
85. Id. 3.26.
86. It is important to ensure that comparability is not too rigidly applied under the CUP
method, and to ensure that comparability is not overlooked or treated less seriously once the case
is treated as "last resort." The delegates were especially concerned that comparability concerns be
stressed for the TNMM, and they devoted a special section of the Guidelines to this topic. Id. I
334.-3.40.
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fer from what the OECD was allowing (subject to more severe restric-
tions) in the TNMM.
The new guidelines deal with this issue by first recognizing that
accounting consistency is important in applying any transfer pricing
method. 7 Because accounting standards and terms may vary, preclud-
ing a precise definition of operating expenses, the guidelines recognize
that it may be necessary in some cases to account for some operating
expenses to achieve consistency and comparability. 8 The level and
types of expenses should also be examined for purposes of comparabil-
ity, and may suggest some adjustment. For example, "[i]f expenses
reflect a functional difference ... an adjustment to the cost plus mark up
may be required."8 9
Perhaps most importantly, the new guidelines set forth a clear, yet
flexible, distinction between the cost plus and net margin approaches.
This distinction acknowledges that there is a spectrum, and the more
operating expenses that are taken into account, the more the cost plus
method "starts to approach a net rather than gross margin." 9° The guide-
lines' conclusion is best conveyed in the following paragraph:
The distinction between gross and net margin analyses may be under-
stood in the following terms. In general, the cost plus method will
use margins computed after direct and indirect costs of production,
while a net margin method will use margins computed after operating
expenses of the enterprise as well. It must be recognised that because
of the variations in practice among countries, it is difficult to draw
any precise lines between the three categories described above. Thus,
for example, an application of the cost plus method may in a particu-
lar case include the consideration of some expenses that might be
considered operating expenses, as discussed in paragraph 2.39. Nev-
ertheless, the problems in delineating with mathematical precision the
boundaries of the three categories described above do not alter the
basic practical distinction between the gross and net margin
approaches. 9'
The foregoing paragraph helps explicate the difference between the
cost plus method and the TNMM, yet at the same time shows that the
difference is not mammoth. It appears that a fully net cost plus analysis
may have been used at times in the past, although the 1979 report did
not precisely describe it.92 This would probably qualify as an applica-
87. Id. 1 2.39.
88. Id.
89. Id. 2.38.
90. Id. 1 2.39.
91. Id. 2.41.
92. See, e.g., 1979 Report, supra note 2, 12 ("the cost plus method starting from the cost of
providing the goods or services, etc. and adding whatever cost and profit mark-up is appropriate
[Vol. 50:577
TRANSFER PRICING
tion of TNMM under the new guidelines. The explanation also helps
illustrate that the TNMM is not quite as new a method as one might
think at first glance, but rather one that both tax administrations and
taxpayers have used when data has not been sufficiently detailed to per-
form a traditional cost plus or resale price analysis.
III. TRANSACTIONAL PROFIT METHODS
The new guidelines accept the two types of transactional profit
methods, the profit split method and the transactional net margin
method, as methods of last resort. 93 Both methods are labelled "transac-
tional" because they must be applied to the profit arising from a con-
trolled transaction or controlled transactions that are appropriate to
aggregate. 94 "Last resort" status means that transactional profit methods
cannot be used when traditional transaction methods can be reliably
applied. However, the guidelines make clear that even in such cases, "it
would be inappropriate to automatically apply a transactional profit
method without first considering the reliability of that method."95
The new guidelines represent the first clear international acceptance
(albeit limited) of profit methods, while at the same time articulating a
distinction between transactional and overall profit methods. The 1979
report was more ambiguous about profit methods, and included some
language that was open to interpretation. For example, Paragraph 13
indicated that "[t]he complexities of real life business situations" may
require the application of "other methods" than traditional transaction
methods,96 but did not clearly articulate those other methods. Paragraph
70 similarly referred to the possible use of "other reasonable
approaches" to arrive at an arm's length price in cases where the CUP,
cost plus, and resale price methods were not satisfactory. 97 Methods
"used in practice" are described, but said to be "by no means exhaus-
• . ."); 69 (profit mark-up may be determined by estimating seller's gross profit). Both
paragraphs imply that the cost-plus mark-up is a gross margin. Although there is room for the
contrary interpretation, most tax administrations and taxpayers had interpreted the method as a
gross margin method, with exceptions for a few types of operating expenses. The new guidelines
offer a rational means of resolving this issue by allowing both gross margins and net margins to be
used. But as the margin gets close to full net, it is necessary to take additional precautions in
determining comparability to account for the potential effect of the company's characteristics (e.g.
competitive position, management efficiency) on operating expenses.
93. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 3.1.
94. Id. 3.5 (profit split); 3.26 (TNMM).
95. Jd. 3.50.
96. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 13.
97. Id. 70.
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tive." 98 Those methods include comparable profits,9 9 the profit split,' 00
and a return on capital approach.' 0 ' While Paragraph 70 suggested that
these methods may be used "with care,"'0 2 some of the language
describing each method could be interpreted more negatively. Thus, the
1979 report took an indefinite position on profit methods, perhaps
because of a lack of experience at the time with the types of cases for
which these methods would be necessary.
A. The Profit Split Method
The new guidelines accept the profit split method as one of last
resort, and describe in some detail two approaches-a "contribution
analysis" and a "residual analysis"-for applying the method.0 3 The
1979 report stopped at providing a simple reference to a method that
attempted "to allocate some proportion of the combined net income aris-
ing from a sales transaction to the various associated enterprises con-
cerned in it on the basis of their proportionate contribution to the final
profit." 0 4 There was no analysis, only a somewhat confusing reference
to Paragraph 14 of the report, which is concerned primarily with global
formulary apportionment.10 5
Paragraph 14 rejects global formulary apportionment, sometimes
called unitary taxation, as a method of arm's length pricing. 0 6 The new
guidelines do the same."' An entire section of Chapter III of the guide-
lines is devoted to this approach and the reasons for its rejection.0 8 But
unlike the 1979 report, the guidelines avoid confusing the profit split
method and global formulary apportionment. The latter method operates
according to a predetermined formula; the former method divides profits
based upon the specific facts and circumstances of each case. Most
importantly, the guidelines' profit split method is not global. It is a
transactional method, and in this respect is clearly distinct from the
approach that Paragraph 14 of the 1979 report described.
The 1979 report did not give thorough consideration to the type of
profit split method that the guidelines describe. That method was
neither rejected nor accepted in 1979; the report simply acknowledged it
98. Id.
99. Id. 71.
100. Id. 72.
101. Id. 73.
102. Id. 70.
103. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 3.15-3.22.
104. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 72.
105. Id. 72, 14.
106. Id. 14.
107. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 3.63.
108. Id. M 3.58-3.74.
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as one of the possible alternatives "used in practice."' 0 9 With a degree
of prescience, the 1979 report through its reference to Paragraph 14
underscored the concern over a nontransactional application of this
method, thereby making the transactional limitation developed in 1995 a
natural and logical progression.
B. Transactional Net Margin Method
Much of the interest in the new guidelines has focused on a newly
described method, the transactional net margin method (TNMM). As
previously discussed, it is unclear how new the method really is, given
the apparent use in practice of fully net resale price and cost plus analy-
ses for some years. What is new is the OECD's articulation of the
method. This method is supposed to operate similarly to the cost plus
and resale price methods, looking only at full net margins rather than
gross or semi-gross margins. 110 It is subject to the same "last resort"
status as the profit split method,"' 1 and it has been adorned with a spe-
cific discussion of concerns about finding adequately comparable trans-
actions." 12 Thus, the method, while permitted, is severely limited.
The 1979 report did not discuss this method, except to the extent
that some might find it inherent in the discussion of cost plus. The
report did address a "comparable profits" approach, but described this
approach as an overall comparison of profits," 3 not at all what the
TNMM envisions. The 1979 report did not reject an overall comparable
profits approach. Paragraph 71 of the report stated that "[t]ax authorities
may find some help in a comparison of an enterprise's overall perform-
ance with that of other similar enterprises in the same or similar circum-
stances."' 14 It concluded that such profit comparisons "could normally
be regarded only as pointers to further investigation."'" The report did
not say whether in last resort cases the method could be used, as it did
not address the question of what should happen outside "normal"
circumstances.
This is one area in which the OECD has clearly changed its posi-
tion since 1979. The new guidelines reject a method that compares
overall levels of profits, even in cases of last resort: "In particular, so-
called 'comparable profits methods' or 'modified cost plus/resale price
methods' are acceptable only to the extent that they are consistent with
109. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 70.
110. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 3.26.
111. Id. 3.50.
112. Id. 3.26.
113. 1979 Report, supra note 2, 71.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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these Guidelines."'1 16 The TNMM allows only a comparison of net mar-
gins, only on a transactional basis, and only in last resort situations.
These restrictions impose substantial limitations on profit comparisons
that the 1979 report lacked. Most importantly, the guidelines remove
any ambiguity that had been present about the boundaries for using such
methods.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
Chapter IV of the new guidelines discusses a host of administrative
issues that the 1979 report did not cover.I17 One important new section
covers transfer pricing compliance practices.""s In this section, tax
examiners "are encouraged to be flexible in their approach" 1 9 and "to
take into account the taxpayer's commercial judgment. . . so that trans-
fer pricing is tied to business realities."' 20 The section suggests that tax
examiners "begin their analyses of transfer pricing from the perspective
of the method that the taxpayer has chosen in setting its prices."121 It
also cautions that neither tax administrations nor taxpayers should "mis-
use the burden of proof' 22 and so should "use restraint"' 23 in relying on
it while examining a transfer pricing case. Both sides should be pre-
pared to make "a good faith showing"' 24 that the proposed transfer pric-
ing is consistent with the arm's length principle, according to the
guidelines. 12
The section on compliance practices also discusses penalty sys-
tems, 126 another issue the 1979 report did not address. The discussion
makes clear that the severity of a penalty should be balanced against the
conditions under which it is imposed, and that "the harsher the penalty
the more limited the conditions in which it would apply."'127 The discus-
sion concludes as follows:
First, imposition of a sizable 'no-fault' penalty based on the mere
existence of an understatement of a certain amount would be unduly
116. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, 3.1.
117. One of these issues--corresponding adjustments and the mutual agreement procedure,
was addressed in part in a 1984 Report by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled
Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises: Three Taxation Issues. See IM 23-40.
118. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 1, IM 4.4-4.28.
119. Id. 4.9.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. 1 4.16.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. 4.18-4.28.
127. Id. 4.27.
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harsh when it is attributable to good faith error rather than negligence
or an actual intent to avoid tax. Second, it would be unfair to impose
sizable penalties on taxpayers that made a reasonable effort in good
faith to set the terms of their transactions with related parties in a
manner consistent with the arm's length principle. In particular, it
would be inappropriate to impose a transfer pricing penalty on a tax-
payer for failing to consider data to which it did not have access, or
for failure to apply a transfer pricing method that would have
required data that was not available to the taxpayer. Tax administra-
tions are encouraged to take these observations into account in the
implementation of their penalty provisions. ' 28
Other significant changes in the chapter on administrative issues
are the concerns expressed over double taxation and other difficulties
that secondary adjustments raise, 129 the rejection of safe harbors, 130 and
guidance on the use of advance transfer pricing arrangements (APA)."'3
The guidelines express particular caution concerning the scope of APAs.
They recommend that taxpayers and tax administrations "pay close
attention to the reliability of any predictions so as to exclude unreliable
predictions. In general, great care must be taken if the APA goes
beyond the methodology, its application, and critical assumptions."' 132
The guidelines also state that the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs
has agreed to study arbitration, and to supplement the guidelines when
that study is completed. 133
V. DOCUMENTATION
The 1979 report touched only tangentially on the issue of documen-
tation. The new guidelines devote a separate chapter, albeit a brief one,
to this important topic. 34 The significance of the chapter is that it artic-
ulates a new standard for determining the appropriate level of documen-
tation from a taxpayer. 3 5 The chapter indicates that "[t]axpayers should
make reasonable efforts at the time transfer pricing is established to
determine whether the transfer pricing is appropriate for tax purposes in
accordance with the arm's length principle."' 136 In determining what
constitutes reasonable efforts, the chapter provides that "[t]he taxpayer's
process of considering whether transfer pricing is appropriate for tax
128. Id. 4.28.
129. Id. IM 4.67-4.77.
130. Id. 4.94-4.123.
131. Id. M 4.124-4.166.
132. Id. 4.162.
133. Id. 4.171.
134. Id. IM 5.1-5.29.
135. Id. 5.1.
136. Id. 5.28; see also Id. 5.3.
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purposes should be determined in accordance with the same prudent
business management principles that would govern the process of evalu-
ating a business decision of a similar level of complexity and
importance." 13 7
The Chapter further makes clear that documents that "would not
have been prepared or obtained other than for tax purposes"'138 should be
expected "only if they are indispensable for a reasonable assessment of
whether the transfer pricing satisfies the arm's length principle and can
be obtained or prepared by the taxpayer without a disproportionately
high cost being incurred."' 39 This standard envisions tax administrators
conducting a type of cost-benefit analysis before asking for documents
other than those kept in the ordinary course of business. Finally, the
chapter provides nonprescriptive detail about the type of information
that may be relevant to a transfer pricing inquiry. 140
VI. FOLLOW-UP
The OECD guidelines are an important first step in the process of
building a long-lasting international understanding on transfer pricing.
Much work remains to be done, including the addition of practical
examples and chapters on intangibles, services,' cost contribution
arrangements, permanent establishments, and aspects of financial
arrangements. The July 1995 agreement will allow this work to go for-
ward in an atmosphere of cooperation and understanding.
It is notable that the guidelines were issued in loose-leaf form both
to facilitate updating and to recognize the new monitoring role assigned
to the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs. In this respect, the OECD
Council recommendation, included as an appendix to the Guidelines,
makes for more interesting reading than it might appear at first glance.
The recommendation specifically charges the committee "to monitor the
implementation of the [guidelines] in cooperation with the tax authori-
ties of Member countries and with the participation of the business com-
munity ... ."I42 Thus, the new guidelines are a beginning, not an end.
Some changes may be necessary, depending on experience. What
is most important is that the member countries stand ready to review this
work and to keep it current, so that there might never again be the threat
137. Id. 5.4.
138. Id. 5.7.
139. Id.
140. Id. 5.16-5.27.
141. The Chapters on intangibles and services were approved by the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs in January 1996, and will be published after approval by the OECD Council.
142. Id. app. § 111.2.
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of a global tax war. That almost sounds like a workable plan for peace.
To that, we can only commend and encourage the intentions of the
member countries and add our own Amen.

